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# **Political, Military, and Economic Dynamics in Iraq: A Graphic Overview**

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**Revised: October 2007**

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# The Iraq Challenge

- May have to leave Iraq suddenly for political reasons, but best strategy is caution.
- Need to seek to contain or limit Iran, resolve Iraqi-Kurdish-Turkish issue, and reassure Sunni allies have not abandoned Iraqi Sunnis.
- If surge succeeds, and conciliation happens, need to phase out US forces at rate that best achieves Iraqi and regional stability.
- If fails, need phased cuts tied to clear political efforts, aid, and option of seeking to bloc civil war turning into military bloodbath.
- Need to reassure key allies that will not leave Gulf, will aid them in dealing with Iran, and seeking some form of stability in Iraq.
- Need clear basing plans.

# Iraqi Governorates


Figure 25. Iraq: Governorate Boundaries (U)




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# Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions




# Iraqi Oil Fields by Governorate




## *Overall Weekly Iraq Attack Trends*

1 October 2004 – 7 September 2007




# High Profile Attacks




As of 31 AUG 07; High Profile = Car bombs + suicide car bombs + suicide vests

# Improvised Explosive Devices




Total IEDs = IED explosions + IEDs found + IED hoaxes

JAN 07



# State of Al Qaeda Iraq



Strategic Detention/EKIA  
15 June to 5 September 07


Emirs of: Media Cells:  
Yusufiyah Ramadi  
N. Iraq Ghazaliyah  
Samarra Baghdad  
Mosul Baqubah  
Diyala Samarra  
North Karkh Tarmiyah  
Arab Jabour  
Hay al Andullah  
Sinjar

July to September  
2007

Killed

Captured


AUG 07








# Major Threats to Iraq



# Baghdad Neighborhoods



# *Ethno-Sectarian Violence*



A horizontal color scale showing a gradient from white on the left to red on the right. Above the scale is a black double-headed arrow pointing horizontally. Below the scale, the word "Least" is written under the white end, and the word "Most" is written under the red end.

Density plots are of incidents where deaths occurred from any means that were clearly ethno-sectarian in motivation, to include car bombs


# Southern Baghdad




# Diyala




# Al Anbar & Iraq




# Insurgents in Anbar




# Sunni Response in Anbar




# Al Anbar: Iraqi 7th Division




# Al Anbar: Iraqi 1st Division




# Al Anbar: Police Services



# Al Anbar: Iraqi DBE



# Tribal Engagement



# Overall Attack Patterns in MNF-I West


## Weekly Incident Totals 1 yr

Unclassified

98 Incidents this week


157 is the 8 week average

257 is the 26 week average




# Civilian Tips in MNF-I West: July 2007

## Civilian Tips\*




# Incident Cycles in MNF-I West

Nov 2003 – May 2007




# Incidents by Initiator in MNF-I West




# Anbar Attacks

CT 06




JAN 07

MAR 07




Anbar

Attacks  
Trend



AUG 07




Density  
Least → Most

Density plots are of locations where attacks occurred


# Decline in Attacks by City

Jul 05 - Jun 07


Falluiah




Rutbah




Hit




Hadithah Triad




# Threat Reduction in Ramadi




# Iraqi Security Force Capabilities



# *Recommended Force Reductions/Mission Shift*




# Iraq: US Aid Status



# The Electricity Problem


Daily Electricity Supplied and Estimated Demand in Iraq Since January 2004




Daily electricity demand August 1-7 was 20 percent above the same period in 2006. Daily supply from the electricity grid was 12 percent below 2006; it met 43 percent of total electricity demand, compared with 58 percent for the year-earlier period.

Average hours of power via electricity grid after meeting demand from essential services: Baghdad 4.9 and nationwide 9.3. Year-ago levels were Baghdad 6.3 hours and nationwide 10.7 hours.


# Crude Oil Production



# Crude Oil Revenues



# Product Import Dependence



Note: This is a daily average for July 30 – August 5


- Diesel: 10.8 ML supply of 24.5 ML target
- Kerosene: 3.3 ML supply of 11.1 ML target
- Gasoline: 9.1 ML supply of 23.1 ML target
- LPG: 1,630 tons supply of 5,100 tons target

# Iraqi Oil Infrastructure



# Iraqi Oil Production

June 2006 – August 2007




Source: DoD. "Measuring Security and Stability on Iraq" September 14, 2007. Pg. 12  
 Note: +/- 5%

# Iraqi Oil Fields

## The thirst for Iraqi oil


While U.S. oil firms have stood on the sidelines, Iraq has negotiated contracts or had serious talks with oil companies from many other nations to develop its vast oil reserves. The map shows some of the major fields and the countries involved.



Source: U.S. Department of Energy, American Petroleum Institute

Times art

# Oil and Gas Resources in Anbar



# Iran's Oil Fields


## Major Iranian Oilfields



# Iran & Iraq as Case Studies

## Demand for Total Liquids vs. Price

(Millions of Barrels Per Day - Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook, 2007,



Average world oil prices in 2030 are \$36, \$59, and \$100 per barrel in 2030